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REVIEW ESSAY
RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
(REVIEW ESSAY OF ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM (1998))
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN*
Professor Eric Foner is one of the most distinguished American
historians of our time. His definitive work on Reconstruction'
garnered numerous awards and has become a widely used source
among American constitutional historians and constitutional
lawyers. Now Foner has written another book that should be of at
least equal interest to the legal academy. The Story of American
Freedom is a massively researched and extraordinarily learned
work, which fully reflects the three decades' worth of reading and
thought that Professor Foner has invested in his subject. The book
is also, as with Foner's other work, beautifully written. Every
lawyer and law professor in America would do well to read this
book.
American Freedom covers virtually every topic touching on the
subject of American freedom from the American Revolution to the
* James Monroe Professor of Law and F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil
Liberties and Human Rights, University of Virginia School of Law. This review essay grew
out of remarks delivered at a panel session on Professor Foner's book, The Story ofAmerican
Freedom (1998), which took place at the University of Virginia School of Law on March 2,
2000. I benefitted from the remarks delivered by Professor Foner on that occasion and am
grateful to him for supporting the idea of converting my panel remarks into a review essay.
I would like to thank the students on the William & Mary Law Review for inviting me to
publish this essay in their journal. It was my pleasure to teach several of them during the
fall semester of 1999, when I was the Distinguished Lee Visiting Professor at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary.
1. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877
(1988).
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Reagan Revolution. Freedom is canvassed in all of its multifarious
guises-political, economic, social, consumerist, etc. Foner is
particularly adept at capturing the ironies that characterize the
story of American freedom. The book begins with an American
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal, yet heavily dependent on slave labor (p. 3).
The story ends with the Reagan Revolution and its reconcep-
tualization of freedom-a universe in which the term "Freedom
Fighters" is used to describe anti-Sandanista guerillas seeking to
overthrow a democratically elected government in Nicaragua, but
never an African National Congress trying to overthrow a vicious
white supremacist regime in South Africa, and in which an
economic bill of rights refers not to providing jobs or subsistence
to the poor, but rather to dismantling economic regulation of
corporations, cutting taxes, and reducing the power of labor unions
(p. 321). What appears in between these bookend ironies is too rich
and multifaceted to lend itself to easy summary. I will not even
attempt such a task here. Suffice it to say that anyone interested in
the history of American freedom-which ought to be everyone-
should read this book.
Indeed American Freedom is so wide ranging and the concept of
freedom is shown to encompass so many diverse meanings that one
begins to wonder if "freedom" really has any bite to it. In Part I of
this review essay, I suggest that Foner's plenitude of examples
illustrating the contestability and malleability of freedom actually
suggest that the concept is vacuous. In Parts II and III, I offer a few
of my own interpretations of the book's data. First, I shall suggest
some possible explanations for why particular freedoms expand
over time. That is, I shall consider the circumstances and conditions
under which particular freedoms prosper. Then I shall turn to a
question that receives surprisingly little attention from Professor
Foner-what is the role of courts in the story of American freedom?
I. THE MALLEABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
A dominant theme of American Freedom is the contested nature
of freedom throughout American history. Professor Foner is so
successful at demonstrating the malleability of freedom in his-
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torical debates that skeptics may question whether the concept has
any bite to it at all. First, let us consider a few examples of the wide
variety of historical debates in which freedom has been invoked
on both sides. Then, we can identify the characteristics of freedom
that render it such a malleable concept. Finally, we can evaluate
whether freedom is so manipulable as to be vacuous, and, if so,
consider the implications.
One pervasive theme of American Freedom is the invocation of
freedom on both sides of various economic disputes throughout
American history. Mid-nineteenth-century Whigs viewed freedom
as a product of energetic government creating the conditions for
economic growth, while Jacksonian Democrats, likewise in the
name of freedom, opposed government intervention in the economy
as conferring special privileges upon the advantaged few (pp. 53-
54). Half a century later, during the Gilded Age, this same debate
reappeared in the guise of Lochner Era courts invalidating economic
reform legislation as inconsistent with liberty of contract, while
Populists and Progressives argued contemporaneously that genuine
freedom was impossible without government regulation of un-
accountable corporations, support for labor unions, and some mild
redistribution of wealth (pp. 115-30). This same debate continued
to rage another half century later, as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt defined the nation's objectives during the Second World
War in terms of the Four Freedoms-not only freedom of speech
and religion, but also freedom from want and fear. Contrast the per-
spective of Roosevelt's opponents in the Liberty League and the
Republican Party who disparaged freedom from want and fear as
New Deal freedoms, rather than American freedoms, and urged
inclusion of a fifth freedom on the list-freedom of private enter-
prise (pp. 227-30).
Foner's point about the contestability of the concept of freedom
in American history is not limited to economic examples. He
contrasts, for example, a conventional, perhaps male-oriented
conception of freedom that sanctifies a private sphere of family
autonomy secure from government regulation, with a feminist
notion of freedom that demands government intervention against
the unfreedom that characterizes a private sphere in which men use
their disproportionate economic and physical power to subordinate
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women (pp. 80-83). Or consider the abortion debate, where one side
emphasizes the freedom of women to control their reproduction, and
the other underscores the freedom of unborn children to live (p.
319). Or compare the Civil Rights Movement's conception of
freedom as the right of African Americans to enjoy equal access to
jobs, housing, and public accommodations regardless of race, with
Barry Goldwater's statements in the 1964 presidential campaign
that fair employment legislation violated the freedom of employers,
with Ronald Reagan's declarations during the 1966 California
guber-natorial campaign that fair housing legislation violated the
freedom of homeowners (pp. 314-15). Finally, and perhaps most
strikingly, consider the northern and southern perspectives on
freedom evinced during the Civil War. Northerners, at least after
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, fought for the freedom of
slaves. Southerners equally fought for freedom-the freedom to
regulate their own "domestic institutions" independent of federal
control and the freedom not to be deprived of their property in
slaves (p. 95).2 1 say this last point is most striking because if even
the slavery issue was debated by both sides in terms of freedom, one
is entitled to wonder whether any substantive position on any
important public policy debate cannot be so defended.
The various examples cited above indicate two reasons why the
concept of freedom is so malleable. First, as Professor Foner rightly
observes, the struggle between positive and negative conceptions of
freedom has persisted throughout American history (e.g., pp. xviii,
53-54, 129-30). Negative liberty is the freedom from government
interference. Positive liberty is the existence of conditions enabling
individuals to realize their potential or accomplish their goals-
conditions that may be attainable only through government
intervention in a private sphere which, if left unregulated, inhibits
the realization of genuine freedom. Foner shows, perhaps sur-
prisingly, that Americans have always embraced both these
competing conceptions of freedom. So long as positive and negative
2. "We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word, we do not all mean the same
thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself,
and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do
as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor." Lincoln's Address at
Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 589 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
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conceptions of freedom are equally valid, freedom arguments are
certain to exist on both sides of every significant public policy
dispute.' Women want to be free of government interference with
their reproductive choices; abortion opponents want the govern-
ment to guarantee the fetuses' freedom to live. The National Rifle
Association wants to be free of government interference with the
right to keep and bear arms, while residents of high-crime urban
neighborhoods want the government to regulate guns so that they
may enjoy freedom to walk the streets uninhibited by constant fear
of gun-related violence. The equal validity of positive and negative
conceptions of liberty makes it impossible to choose between the two
sides of these debates solely in terms of the quality of their freedom
arguments.
Second, freedom conceived as an individual right operates as a
"trump" against legislative majorities.4 Yet freedom conceived as a
political right entails the capacity of democratic majorities to
control their destinies through legislation.' Again, so long as both
these conceptions of freedom are equally valid, freedom arguments
necessarily will exist on both sides of every policy debate. The
individual freedom of women to reproductive choice is in tension
with the political freedom of democratic majorities to regulate
abortion, a subject upon which the Constitution arguably does not
speak.6 The individual freedom of gays and lesbians to avoid
government discrimination based on sexual orientation is in-
consistent with the political freedom of democratic majorities to
define the moral bounds of their community.' Without privileging
or disqualifying one of these competing conceptions of freedom,
equally respectable freedom arguments are certain to appear on
both sides of every policy dispute.
If these two observations about freedom are correct, then I
wonder if Professor Foner can be right when he states that,
although freedom "is a contested concept, it is not merely an empty
3. This is one of the fundamental points made in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARKV.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996).
4. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAXING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
5. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
6. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221-22
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
7. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with id. at 636, 653 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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vessel" (p. xvii). If the positive/negative and individual/political
conceptions of freedom are equally valid, and thus freedom can be
invoked with equal plausibility on either side of any significant
political debate, then why isn't freedom a vacuous concept, an
"empty vessel"? Perhaps I am mistaken, but I suspect that by dem-
onstrating the infinite contestability and malleability of freedom,
Foner has proven that the concept does no serious work in the
various debates in which it is invoked.
This is not to say, of course, that all arguments about freedom
are equally convincing. It is to say that the reason some such
arguments are more persuasive than others has nothing to do with
their merit as arguments about freedom, but rather is attributable
to the attractiveness of the substantive cause on behalf of which
they are mustered. The southern slaveowners who invoked the
freedom to take their slave property into federal territories as a
basis for invalidating the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott v.
Sandford8 were not making a conceptually flawed freedom argu-
ment. Protection of property rights against government interference
and insistence upon the limited scope of federal regulatory power
are time honored freedom arguments. The slaveowners' claim fails
to resonate with us in the year 2000 not because it misapplies the
concept of freedom, but rather because we no longer regard property
in human beings as the sort of freedom that warrants protection.
Similarly, white Southerners who criticized Brown v. Board of
Education9 as an invasion of their freedom did not misunderstand
the concept. The freedom of local communities to govern their own
schools and of individuals to choose with whom they associate have
long and respected historical pedigrees. Such freedom arguments
are unpersuasive to us today not because they misconstrue the
concept of freedom, but rather because we no longer choose to
respect the freedom of those who denigrate other human beings
because of their race or to defer to the freedom of local political
majorities to use their power in the service of white supremacy.
Foner's compelling, if unintended, demonstration of freedom's
infinite malleability thus yields an important lesson. Freedom,
8. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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much like equality," is an empty concept. To say that one favors
freedom is really to say nothing at all. As is so often the case in
constitutional law, one ultimately cannot avoid taking a position on
the merits. Whether freedom is good or bad depends entirely on the
particular substantive cause on behalf of which freedom is invoked.
II. WHEN DOES FREEDOM PROSPER?
Although Professor Foner does not explicitly address this point,
the material canvassed in American Freedom bears directly on a
question of great importance to students of American freedom:
Under what conditions do particular liberties prosper and expand?"
Let me suggest three explanations for why the stock of certain
freedoms rises over time. These accounts are neither mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive. I offer them simply as my own speculation
as to why particular freedoms have prospered at certain moments
in American history.
First, a particular liberty may become more attractive because it
is intimately associated with a substantive cause that has gained
popularity. For example, as Foner notes, during the first third of
the twentieth century, freedom of speech was closely identified with
the labor movement (p. 164). Specifically, freedom of speech was
generally understood to mean the right of labor unions to organize,
picket, and boycott.'" As a result of the Great Depression and the
New Deal, the political and social status of organized labor grew
tremendously during the 1930s. It is no accident that by the end of
that decade, the Supreme Court for the first time had extended
First Amendment protection to labor union picketing, pamphleting,
10. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
11. Just to be clear, I emphasize that there is no tension between this point and the one
made in the preceding part. The lesson of Part I was that as one freedom expands, another
freedom necessarily contracts. For example, an expansion of the freedom of gunowners
contracts the freedom of likely victims of gun-related violence. My focus in this Part is on
the conditions that facilitate the expansion of particular freedoms. The expansion of those
particular freedoms necessarily means a contraction of some other set of freedoms.
12. This paragraph draws on the more expanded discussion in Michael J. Kiarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1996).
See also Geoffrey D. Berman, Note, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor
Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291 (1994).
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and organizing. 3 Similarly in the 1950s and 1960s, free speech
became intertwined with another substantive cause that was
beginning to prosper-the Civil Rights Movement.14 Again, it is no
accident that many of the landmark free speech decisions of the
Warren Court emanated from civil rights controversies. 5
The Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution may be
another example of how particular freedoms expand when associ-
ated with substantive causes that are gaining in popularity. Most
criminal defendants are poor, and a disproportionate number are
members of minority racial groups. The 1960s witnessed both a
Civil Rights Movement and a War on Poverty. There is little doubt
that the Warren Court Justices thought about criminal procedure
issues in terms of race and wealth discrimination.'6 The Court's
first forays into regulating state criminal procedure in the 1920s
and 1930s mainly came in cases of egregious mistreatment of black
defendants by the criminal justice system of southern states. Yet
as late as the 1960s, at least some Justices continued to think about
criminal procedure cases in racial terms." Likewise, the connection
between criminal procedure rights and poverty could not be missed
in cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright,9 and lay only slightly
beneath the surface in cases like Miranda v. Arizona.2"
A second explanation for the advance of particular freedoms
focuses on war. This connection is ironic, because in the short term,
wartime exigencies seem to diminish freedom. Examples of this
13. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
14. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
15. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. I have elaborated on this argument in Klarman, supra note 12, at 62-65.
17. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). I have
investigated the connection between race and the origins of modern criminal procedure at
greater length in Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000).
18. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREIE COURT-A
JUDIciAL BIOGRAPHY 591 (1983); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 673, 678, 750-51 (1992).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure,
75 VA. L. REV. 761, 837-38 (1989).
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phenomenon abound. Military detention and trial of civilians was
widespread during the Civil War.21 The Sedition and Espionage
Acts of 1917-18 were used to suppress criticism of the Wilson
administration's conduct during World War 1.22 World War II
resulted in a massive interference with the freedom of Japanese
Americans.23 The Cold War provided the occasion for substantial
impingements upon freedom of speech and due process. 24
Yet American wars also have produced longer term advances in
freedom, especially by expanding the pool of freedom's benefi-
ciaries.2' The Revolutionary War led to the First Emancipation of
slaves in the North and a temporary increase in individual
manumissions in parts of the South.2 ' The Civil War not only
emancipated the slaves, but also expanded the civil and political
rights of the Freedmen. It is no accident that women received the
right to vote through federal constitutional amendment during
World War 1.28 World War II was the proximate cause of the modern
Civil Rights Movement.29 It also proved a fruitful source of fred
speech growth. Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, won the right to
abstain from saluting the flag during World War II-a right that
had been denied to them through the late 1930s.0 °
War may expand particular freedoms for a variety of reasons.
First, Americans tend to define their war aims in democratic terms.
21. See, e.g., MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1991).
22. See, e.g., PAULL. MURPHY, WORLD WAR IAND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979).
23. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
24. See, e.g., RICHARDM. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THEMCCARTHYERAINPERSPECTIVE
(1990).
25. For a similar claim, see PHiP A. KLINNKER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY
MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999).
26. See, e.g., ARTHURZILVERSMIT, THE FIRSTEMANCIPATION: THEABOLlTIONOFSLAVERY
IN THE NORTH 109-12, 117-19, 227-29 (1967).
27. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 1, at 114-15, 223, 244-45, 255; JAMIEs M. MCPHERSON,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 29-37 (1990).
28. See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN THi UNITED STATES 294 (1975).
29. See, e.g., JOHN DIT MER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI ch. 1 (1994); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915-1972, at ch. 4 (1995).
30. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); DAVID R.
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 72 (1962).
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World War I was the war "to make the world safe for democracy."
World War II was fought against fascism and the multitude of
unfreedoms it represented. How much the articulation of war aims
in ideological terms affects the fate of American freedom is a
complex question that cannot be resolved here. It must be conceded
that most white Southerners showed remarkable creativity in
rationalizing a war against fascism while preserving their own
commitment to white supremacy.3' But other Americans, less
heavily invested in the maintenance of Jim Crow, could not escape
the cognitive dissonance inherent in fighting against Nazi doctrines
of Aryan supremacy with a segregated army.2 The Supreme Court,
unable to reconcile the war's democratic ideology with the continued
disfranchisement of southern blacks, finally invalidated the white
primary in 1944."a The Court likewise invalidated sterilization of
recidivist criminals with a disapproving, thinly veiled reference to
the eugenic experiments of Nazi scientists.34 Another Court ruling
in 1940 expanded the due process ban on coerced confessions with
a disparaging allusion to the law enforcement tactics of totalitarian
nations.35 Finally, the Justices who invalidated the compulsory flag
salute in 1943 cannot have been oblivious to the fact that it was
Hitler who first put Jehovah's Witnesses on the world map by
persecuting them for refusing to heil the Fuhrer. 6 Apparently, at
least in the chambers of Supreme Court Justices, ideologically
articulated war aims force some reconciliation of national principles
with national practices.
Wars also may advance the cause of certain freedoms through
their general dislocative effects. Wars, especially total ones like the
Civil War and World War II, undermine traditional patterns of
status and behavior. President Lincoln decided to emancipate and
31. See, e.g., Johnpeter Horst Grill & Robert L. Jenkins, The Nazis and the American
South in the 1930s: A Mirror Image?, 58 J. S. HIsT. 667 (1992).
32. See, e.g., NEILR. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROw 317 (1989); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 23-26 (1994) (citing sources).
33. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
35. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
36. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); MANWARING,
supra note 30, at 30-31, 123, 154.
274 [Vol. 42:265
20001 RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
then to arm the slaves only after a year-long effort to suppress
disunionism without disrupting traditional racial patterns had
proved unavailing." The women's suffrage movement, which for
nearly three-quarters of a century had failed to secure a consti-
tutional amendment enfranchising women, finally triumphed
during World War I, when military conscription and industrial
preparedness reduced the male labor supply sufficiently to force
popular acceptance of women assuming nontraditional economic
and social roles.8 The extraordinary manpower demands created
by World War II likewise opened unprecedented civil and military
opportunities for African Americans and thus accelerated the
breakdown of traditional patterns of racial subordination.39 Blacks
moved from South to North and from farm to city, creating new
opportunities for the exercise of political power and the organi-
zation of social protest. African Americans returning from military
service were far less inclined to passively endure the oppressive
racial status quo. The disruption of world relations caused by the
war resulted in a new international order, in which Americans had
to choose between altering their racial practices and sacrificing
their pretensions to leadership of a largely nonwhite Third World
that had some justification for identifying American capitalist
democracy with racial oppression.4 °
Finally, war usually involves common sacrifice for the general
good and thus has inescapably egalitarian implications. The sacri-
fices of the Freedmen on Civil War battlefields helped secure
postwar constitutional amendments guaranteeing basic civil and
political rights to African Americans.41 The contributions of women
on the home front during the First World War helped push the
women's suffrage movement over the top.42 The battlefield sacrifices
37. See, e.g., DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LiNCOLN ch. 13 (1995); JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA ch. 16 (1988).
38. See FLEXNER, supra note 28, at 298-99.
39. For the rest of this paragraph, see sources cited in Klarman, supra note 32, at 14-23.
40. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold WarImperative, 41 STAN. L. REV.
61 (1988).
41. See, e.g., WILLIAA GILLETTE, THE RIGHTTOVOTE: POLITICSAND THE PASSAGE OFTHE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 81, 85 (1965); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 6 (1990).
42. See FLEXNER, supra note 28, at 298-99.
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of American Catholics during that same war paved the way for their
accelerated assimilation into the nation's cultural mainstream
during the 1920s and 1930s, as America's unofficial Protestant
establishment began slowly to crumble.' If African Americans were
good enough to fight and die for their country during World War II,
surely they were good enough to vote and to deserve federal
government protection against lynching and other racially moti-
vated violence."
Whatever the precise causal mechanism, American wars often
have advanced the cause of particular freedoms, especially by
expanding the pool of beneficiaries.
A perusal of American history suggests a third way in which
particular freedoms expand-through a backlash effect generated
by opponents overplaying their hand. Examples are plentiful; I
shall limit myself to a few, particularly salient instances. The
Sedition Act of 1798, deployed aggressively by Federalists to
suppress Republican criticism of the Adams administration, appar-
ently produced a backlash against seditious libel prosecutions and
in favor of a broader conception of free speech.45 Widespread mob
violence against abolitionist speakers and newspaper editors in
northern states during the 1830s-including tarring and feathering,
destruction of printing presses, and one particularly salient
murder-ultimately generated a backlash in favor of the free speech
rights of these antislavery agitators.46 A couple thousand criminal
prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts during World
War I-targeting not only anarchists and communists, but also
socialists, pacifists, and civil libertarian critics of the Wilson
administration-inspired the creation of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union and probably facilitated the Supreme Court's in-
auguration of modern First Amendment doctrine a decade later.47
43. See, e.g., ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-1920, at 189-90 (1991).
44. See, e.g., ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE 57 (1985); NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 29 (1976).
45. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS chs. 9-10 (1985).
46. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery
Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785 (1995).
47. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 22; SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN
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Hitler and his Nazi Holocaust resulted in a dramatic expansion in
the freedom of American Jews after World War H.48 Perhaps the
most famous exemplar of this backlash phenomenon is the
mobilization of national opinion behind the enactment of landmark
civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965 in direct response to the
televised scenes of police brutalization of civil rights demonstrators
in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama.49 It is possible that we are
witnessing a similar phenomenon today, as the notorious homo-
phobic murders of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming and of Private
Barry Winchell at Fort Campbell, Kentucky may be generating a
backlash in favor of gay rights."0
This backlash dynamic is ironic, but probably not surprising. It
is common wisdom that a profitable strategy in politics is to induce
one's opponents to overplay their hand. The same is true in the
story of American freedom.
III. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
From a law professor's perspective, the most striking feature of
American Freedom may be the minimal role that courts play in the
story. I noticed just one reference to a court decision in the book's
first hundred pages, and that was to Dred Scott, where the freedom
protected by the Court was that of Southerners to take their slaves
into the federal territories (p. 75). Courts continue to play a de
minimus role throughout the remainder of American Freedom. For
example, Brown v. Board of Education, probably the most famous
case in the history of the United States Supreme Court, is the
subject ofjust two index references; each is to a single sentence that
mentions the decision almost in passing (pp. 258-59, 314). Many
lawyers surely would criticize Foner for unduly minimizing the role
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU chs. 1-2 (1990).
48. See, e.g., EDWARD S. SHAPIRO, ATIMEFORHEALING:AMERICAN JEWRYSINCE WORLD
WARI chs. 1-2 (1992).
49. See, e.g., GLENN T. EsKEW, BUT FOR BIRmINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRuGGLE chs. 8-9 (1997); DAVID J. GARROw, PROTEST AT
SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); Klarman,
supra note 32, at 14149 (citing additional sources).
50. See, e.g., Kenneth Sherrill & Alan Yang, From Outlaws to In-laws, Anti-Gay
Attitudes Thaw, 11 PUB. PERSP. 20 (Jan. 2000).
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of courts in the story of American freedom. Yet I found his eschewal
of court fetishism refreshing. Leave it to a history professor to
remind us lawyers that, in the grand scheme of things, courts have
played a relatively marginal role in the history of American
freedom. That is not to say no role at all, but rather a fairly small
one.
I have three points to make about the role of courts in the story
of American freedom. First, and most importantly, courts are less
important to this story than most lawyers, and probably many
historians (though not Foner), believe."' One reason is that
American history reveals that "courts love liberty most when it is
under pressure least."52 This insight should come as no surprise:
Judges are part of contemporary culture and thus are exceedingly
unlikely to interpret the Constitution in ways that depart dramat-
ically from contemporary public opinion.53 Examples of the Court
failing to intervene on behalf of freedom when most needed are
legion. The Supreme Court never lifted a finger against the most
massive deprivation of freedom in American history, African
American slavery, and on several occasions intervened on its
behalf.54 Likewise, the Court legitimized segregation and dis-
franchisement for much of the Jim Crow era,55 upheld seditious
libel prosecutions during World War I,56 validated the Japanese
American internment during World War II," sanctioned perse-
cution of alleged Communists during the McCarthy era,5" and
51. For some typical statements, see the sources cited in Kiarman, supra note 12, at 1-3
nn.1-14.
52. John P. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COuRT AND SUPREME LAW
109, 114 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
53. See generally Kiarman, supra note 12.
54. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842). See generally
William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-
1860, 65 J. AM. HIsT. 34 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213
(1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally Michael J. Klarman, The
Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303.
56. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
57. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
58. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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approved sex discrimination until after the emergence of the
modern women's movement.59
Even when the Court has invoked the Constitution on behalf of
freedom causes that are widely celebrated today, as often as not it
has deployed an emerging or existing national consensus to sup-
press outlier state practices. Many of the Court's most famous free-
dom decisions exemplify this paradigm: Griswold v. Connecticut"
(striking down a state ban on contraceptive use, as applied to
married couples); Gideon v. Wainwright6 (requiring state-appointed
defense counsel in all felony cases); Pierce v. Society of Sisters"
(invalidating a state law barring children from attending private
school); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections63 (striking down the
poll tax); Nixon v. Herndon64 (barring a state-mandated white
primary); and Moore v. City of East Cleveland65 (invalidating
legislation denying certain blood relatives the right to live in a
single household). In all of these cases, the Court's ruling had
the effect of invalidating laws in no more than a small handful
of states; additional examples easily might be cited. Invoking
the Constitution to invalidate extreme outlier practices hardly
represents a momentous contribution to the story of American
freedom.
Even in the civil rights context, where the conventional wisdom
regarding the instrumental role of courts in the story of American
freedom is especially entrenched,66 the judicial contribution is easily
59. See, e.g., Hoytv. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaertv. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SexualEquality Under the Fourteenth and EqualRightsAmendments,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-64.
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the
Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswoldv. Connecticut, 75 IOWAL. REV. 915,920(1990).
61. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see John F. Decker & Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to
Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103,
104(1970).
62. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM,
EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 134, 148 (1994).
63. 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see id. at 666 n.4.
64. 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see DARLENE CLARKHINE, BLACKVICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS 47-49 (1979).
65. 431 U.S. 494 (1977); see Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup.
CT. REV. 329, 391.
66. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
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exaggerated. Most of the Supreme Court's interventions on behalf
of African Americans prior to World War II were limited in scope
and utterly trivial in consequence.67 Brown v. Board of Education,
the most celebrated of all Court decisions, was rendered possible
only by the dramatic changes in racial attitudes and practices set
in motion by the New Deal and World War 11.68 A decade or two
earlier, when a decision invalidating public school segregation
would have been dramatically countermajoritarian (and almost
certainly unenforceable),69 the Justices did not seriously think of
rendering it.70 Nor, once decided, did Brown produce significant
results until the national political branches had mobilized behind
it. 7 l That development was a product of the Civil Rights Movement,
not Brown, and the one had less to do with the other than is tradi-
tionally assumed.72 None of this is to deny, however, that the
NAACP's litigation campaign played a significant role in mobilizing
African Americans to protest the racial status quo, or that early
Court victories may have provided an inspirational ray of hope in
an otherwise barren landscape. It is to say that Court decisions,
including Brown, played relatively little role in undermining Jim
Crow practices and that the critical battles of the Civil Rights
Movement were fought on the streets of southern cities, not in
courtrooms.
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWNV. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1976).
67. Both the cases and their consequences are discussed in Klarman, supra note 55;
Michael J. Kiarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881 (1998);
Klarman, supra note 17.
68. See Klarman, supra note 32, at 7-75.
69. See MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, NEITHER HERO, NORVILLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT, RACE
ANDTHE CONSTITUTIONiNTHETWENTIETH CENTURY ch. 3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 48-51,
62-63, on file with William and Mary Law Review).
70. See Gong Lumv. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Memorandum ofWilliam 0. Douglas (Jan.
25, 1960), in The DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 169 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987) (noting a Frankfurter statement in
1960 to the effect that he would have voted to uphold segregation in the 1940s had such a
case reached the Court, because "public opinion had not then crystallized against it").
71. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? chs. 2-3 (1991).
72. I have developed this argument at some length in Klarman, supra note 32, at 75-150.
73. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 67, at 946-52; Klarman, supra note 17 (manuscript at
43-45, on file with William and Mary Law Review).
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Recent advances in the freedom of women and gays and lesbians
even more obviously have been secured without any significant
contribution from the Court. The women's liberation movement
already had become a vibrant force in national politics before the
Justices invalidated their first sex classification in 1971.74 Though
the Court did strike down many more such laws over the ensuing
decade, 75 most of these interventions were relatively trivial in their
implications-chopping down some dead legislative wood is not
much of an overstatement.71 Moreover, the Court declined to inter-
vene against legislation embracing some of the most harmful
sex stereotypes, 77 and, in one remarkable decision, denied that
pregnancy classifications were sex related.78 Similarly, dramatic
advances in the freedom of gays and lesbians secured over the
past few decades have been won almost entirely without judicial
assistance.79
Again, none of this is to deny that occasionally the Supreme
Court does strike blows in defense of freedoms that do not enjoy
majoritarian support. Clearly, the Court's decisions invalidating
school prayer or flag-burning prohibitions and protecting the
procedural rights of criminal suspects have not commanded
majority support.80 Yet even with regard to these decisions, it is
important to appreciate the limits of the Court's inclination and
capacity to frustrate majority opinion. The Justices invalidated
school prayer and Bible reading only after the relative demise of the
nation's unofficial Protestant establishment,81 and these decisions
74. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
75. See, e.g., MississippiUniv. forWomen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craigv. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
76. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 511 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Rostkerv. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
78. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
79. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), is the only Supreme Court decision
guaranteeing the equal protection rights of gays and lesbians, and it invalidated an obvious
outlier statute.
80. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For the polls on flag burning and school prayer,
see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 606 n.142, 608
n.155 (1993).
81. See Kiarman, supra note 12, at 46-62.
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were widely defied in practice. 2 Likewise, the Warren Court's
criminal procedure revolution was rendered possible only by
shifting public attitudes toward race, poverty, and totalitarian law
enforcement practices; 83 subsequent Courts have significantly re-
trenched upon it,84 and the practical effect of decisions expanding
the freedom of criminal suspects has been largely blunted by the
unwillingness of legislatures to adequately fund defense counsel.85
Second, to the limited extent that judicial decisions have in-
fluenced the story of American freedom, they have been as likely to
hinder as to advance the cause of particular liberties. This point is
directly related to one made earlier: Because the concept of freedom
plausibly can be invoked on either side of virtually any historical
controversy, when the Court advances one brand of freedom, it
necessarily infringes upon another. For example, when the Court
defends under the First Amendment the freedom of affluent people
to spend money on influencing elections,86 it undermines the
freedom of other people to enjoy an electoral process uncorrupted by
the influence of money. A court that defends the right of gun owners
to keep and bear arms simultaneously abridges the freedom of
persons living in high-crime urban areas to enjoy lives unimpaired
by the constant fear of gun-related violence. When the Supreme
Court defends the freedom of women to control their reproduction
through abortion,87 it nullifies the freedom of fetuses to live. Once
one concedes that freedom has a positive as well as a negative
component, as discussed above, an advance for one freedom cause
necessarily represents a setback for another.
Even setting this point aside and focusing on one particular
brand of freedom, calculating whether courts have advanced or
82. See, e.g., FRANKJ. SoRAUF, THE WALLOF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONALPoLITICS
OF CHURCH AND STATE 296-300 (1976); H. Frank Way, Jr., Survey Research on Judicial
Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189 (1968).
83. See Klarman, supra note 12, at 62-66.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing
the exigent circumstances exception to Miranda warnings).
85. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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retarded its cause over the course of American history is extremely
complicated. For example, has the Supreme Court been more of a
help or a hindrance to the cause of African American liberation over
the past two centuries? The answer seems genuinely uncertain to
me. On the one hand, the Supreme Court struck many early blows
against the "legal lynchings" of black criminal defendants,"
gradually chipped away at southern state mechanisms for disfran-
chising blacks, 9 and invalidated (eventually) racial segregation in
housing and public education.9" On the other hand, the same Court
also invalidated northern personal liberty laws designed to protect
free blacks from kidnapping by slavecatchers,91 voided Congress's
effort to restrict the spread of slavery into federal territories while
simultaneously denying that even free blacks possessed any rights
"which the white man was bound to respect,"92 struck down the
1875 Civil Rights Act provision guaranteeing blacks "full and equal"
access to public accommodations,93 legitimized racial segregation
and black disfranchisement for many decades early in the twentieth
century,94 and in the last decade or so has invalidated numerous
affirmative action plans and minority voting districts ostensibly
designed to benefit African Americans.95 It is by no means certain
how one should evaluate this balance sheet. At a minimum, the
Court plainly is not the unvarnished defender of racial minorities
that it sometimes has been cracked up to be.
Thus, even if one believes that courts have made a larger con-
tribution to the story of American freedom than I previously
88. See supra note 17.
89. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
90. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
91. See Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
92. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
93. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. See, e.g., Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
95. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shawv. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
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allowed, it remains uncertain whether they are more likely to
advance or to retard the cause of any particular freedom. Is there
anything further to be said about which sorts of freedom courts are
likely to champion, or is this simply a crapshoot? Given the contest-
ability of what counts as a valid source of constitutional law and the
rampant indeterminacy characteristic of the constitutional text,
courts probably can marshal adequate "legal" support for advancing
just about any freedom cause they are likely to cherish, assuming
the requisite backing for that cause in contemporary popular
opinion.96 But which brands of freedom are likely to resonate best
with courts? Because judges are products of contemporary culture,
their freedom commitments are likely to reflect in a general way
contemporary attitudes toward freedom. For example, both the
Supreme Court's validation of racial segregation in 1896 and its
invalidation in 1954 generally reflected contemporary attitudes
regarding the appropriate scope of freedom for African Americans."
Yet courts are not perfect mirrors of contemporary mores. At a
minimum, Supreme Court Justices differ from the average
American in three ways: they are more likely to be lawyers, to be
well educated, and to be relatively affluent.98 These systematic
differences undoubtedly influence the sorts of freedom that the
Supreme Court is likely to deem worthy of constitutional protection.
Lawyers tend to value process, and Supreme Court Justices histor-
ically have been more protective of the procedural rights of criminal
defendants than has public opinion.99 Well-educated people, ac-
cording to contemporary opinion polls, have systematically different
attitudes toward abortion, school prayer, and gay rights than the
average member of society. 00 And the Supreme Court has been
96. For numerous examples of the indeterminacy of the constitutional text, see Michael
J. Kiarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of ConstitutionalEvil, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1739 (1997). For the disagreement over the permissible sources of constitutional
interpretation, see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETrLED CoNSTrrUTION: A NEW
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDIcIAL REVIEW ch. 1 (forthcoming 2001).
97. See Klarman, supra note 32; Klarman, supra note 55.
98. I have further developed this point about the culturally elite biases inherent in
judicial review in Michael J. Klarman, What's So GreatAbout Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1998).
99. Miranda probably is the best exemplar of this phenomenon, though dozens of other
cases corroborate the point.
100. See Klarman, supra note 98, at 190 n.245.
284 [Vol. 42:265
2000] RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
more willing to protect abortion rights, bar school prayer, and
invalidate antigay legislation than the average American appar-
entlywould like.'0 ' Finally, affluent people are more likely to oppose
wealth redistribution than the median voter. Historically, the
Supreme Court frequently has checked legislative efforts to
redistribute wealth,10 2 and on only the rarest of occasions has it
attempted to coerce redistribution, and even then in only the
mildest of forms.'0 3
Thus, while courts have not played a tremendously significant
role in the history of American freedom, their interventions
predictably have favored those freedoms that affluent, well-
educated lawyers tend to value, rather than those touted by less
affluent, less well-educated lay people. In a nutshell, we should
hardly be surprised that the Supreme Court has offered solid
support for the freedom to read books and to express political
opinions, 0 4 but has done essentially nothing to advance the freedom
to keep and bear arms."5
Finally, not only have court decisions played a relatively small
role in the story of American freedom, and retarded as often as
they have advanced the cause of particular freedoms, but they also
have sometimes produced extremely unpredictable consequences.
Observers probably have been too quick to assume that when courts
intervene on the side of a particular freedom, its cause is reliably
advanced. Yet Supreme Court decisions often produce the most
bizarre consequences. Consider a few of the most salient historical
101. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The gay rights example is complicated by the fact that
Supreme Court Justices are also significantly older than the average American, a
demographic fact that cuts against tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. On this culture
war issue, then, the bias toward liberal attitudes produced by the Justices' greater education
and relative affluence is at least partially offset by the bias toward conservative attitudes
produced by their greater age.
102. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Pollock v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
See generally ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT chs. 3-6 (2d ed. 1994).
103. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia State Bd.,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
104. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444(1969).
105. Revealingly, there is no canonical citation to use here.
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examples. Prigg v. Pennsylvania,"6 which invalidated a personal
liberty law as inconsistent with the Fugitive Slave Act, apparently
inspired northern states to enact even more aggressive statutes to
protect their free black citizens from kidnapping, thus evading or
in some instances outright defying the Court's mandate. 10 7 Dred
Scott v. Sandford mainly served to mobilize Republicans in defense
of the legitimacy of their party, which the Court essentially had
ruled unconstitutional by invalidating congressional prohibitions on
slavery in the federal territories.0 8 Miranda v. Arizona not only
expanded the freedom of criminal suspects, but also helped elect
Richard Nixon president in 1968, thus leading to the appointment
of federal judges less sympathetic to that freedom.'0 9 The most
dramatic short term impact of Brown v. Board of Education was to
crystallize southern white resistance to changes in the racial status
quo and thus to propel southern politics sharply to the right." 0 Roe
v. Wade not only announced a constitutional right to abortion but
also mobilized a right-to-life opposition that continues to play a
prominent role in American politics to the present day."' Within
the last decade, the most palpable consequence of the Hawaii
Supreme Court decision invalidating a ban on gay marriage 12 has
been to mobilize thirty state legislatures and Congress to enact
statutes reaffirming the traditional heterosexual limitation on
marriage.1
Thus, even if court decisions matter more to the story of
American freedom than I have acknowledged, evaluating their
overall consequences is a formidable task. Landmark Court deci-
sions often seem to mobilize political opposition as effectively as
106. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
107. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State
Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 21-35 (1979).
108. See, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 561-67 (1978).
109. See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND chs. 8, 12-13 (1970).
110. See Kiarman, supra note 32, at 75-150.
111. See, e.g., JEFFRIES, supra note 76, at 354-59; ROSENBERG, supra note 71, at 188,341-
42.-
112. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
113. See, e.g., Hanna Rosin & Pamela Ferdinand, GaysAchieve Breakthrough in Vermont,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al.
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they advance the cause of freedom that the Court has identified for
constitutional protection.
The story of American freedom is complex, multifaceted, and
filled with ironic twists and turns. The concept of freedom has
proven sufficiently malleable to accommodate both (or all) sides of
virtually every significant historical controversy. The tension
between positive and negative conceptions of freedom, and between
a conceptioii grounded in individual zones of autonomy and a
competing notion rooted in the right of political majorities to
democratic self-governance, virtually ensures that all contestants
will carry their own freedom banner into battle. This is not to say
that all claims to freedom will be equally convincing. It is to say
that any particular claim must be adjudicated on the merits of the
posited freedom, rather than on whether the claim satisfies the
criteria for a valid freedom argument.
Particular freedoms expand over time for a variety of reasons.
Freedoms that become popularly associated with attractive sub-
stantive causes, like the Civil Rights Movement, tend to prosper.
Freedoms relating to equality and democracy seem to expand
during wartime, as a result of ideologically-articulated war aims,
the disruption of traditional patterns of behavior and status that
war produces, and the egalitarian implications of equal sacrifice for
the common good. Particular freedoms also seem to advance when
their opponents are provoked into extreme forms of resistance.
Finally, the role of courts in the story of American freedom is
complex and perhaps counterintuitive. Judges are too much a
product of their cultural milieu to make more than a marginal
contribution to American freedom. Because of the infinite malle-
ability of the concept of freedom, moreover, court decisions that
advance one brand of freedom are certain to retard another. Courts
are likeliest to promote the freedom causes that resonate with the
culturally elite biases of well-educated, relatively affluent lawyers.
Yet, because court decisions often mobilize intense political oppo-
sition, their overall effect may be to hinder as much as to promote
the freedoms identified for judicial protection.
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The only obvious lesson to draw from the story of American
freedom is that the subject is a great deal more complicated than it
initially appears.
